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Abstract With the advent of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), PUF-
based quantum authentication systems (QAS) have been proposed for security
purposes and recently proof-of-principle experiment has been demonstrated.
As a further step towards completing the security analysis, we investigate
quantum cloning attacks against PUF-based quantum authentication systems
and prove that quantum cloning attacks outperform the so-called challenge-
estimation attacks. We present the analytical expression of the false accept
probability by use of the corresponding optimal quantum cloning machines
and extend the previous results in the literature. In light of these findings, an
explicit comparison is made between PUF-based quantum authentication sys-
tems and quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols in the context of cloning
attacks. Moreover, from an experimental perspective, a trade-off between the
average photon number and the detection efficiency is discussed in detail.
Keywords Quantum cloning attacks · Physical Unclonable Functions ·
Quantum authentication · Quantum key distribution
1 Introduction
Modern cryptographic applications, such as identification and authentication,
rely on mathematical one-way functions, which provide significant asymmetry
between a black-box inverter and a non-black-box extractor. However, they
are confronted with serious challenges from both practical and fundamental
aspects. On one hand, the enormous development has recently been made in
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the field of network parallel computation and rapid reverse-engineering tech-
nology; on the other hand, a complete proof of security is still missing although
the cryptographic primitives employed nowadays are believed to be secure.
The concept of physical unclonable function (PUF) was introduced by R.
Pappu et al. to address all these security issues [1,2]. In contrast to math-
ematical one-way functions, a PUF is a physical entity that is embodied in
a specific physical structure and is easy to evaluate but hard to characterize
[3]. As its name suggests, an individual PUF must be easy to be fabricated
but practically infeasible to be duplicated, even given the exact manufacturing
process that produced it. In this sense, it is the physical analog of a mathe-
matical one-way function. Since the advent of the definition of PUF, a great
deal of PUF or PUF-like proposals and implementations have been raised as
cryptographic primitives for security purposes, such as Optical PUFs [1,2],
Coating PUFs [4], Arbiter PUFs [5], Ring Oscillator PUFs [6], SRAM PUFs
[7], etc. For more details, we refer the readers to Ref. [8].
Due to the desirable properties of PUF, such as unclonablity and unpre-
dictability, it naturally leads us to design authentication or anti-counterfeiting
protocols based on PUF devices. For instance, in the seminar paper by R.
Pappu et al. [1,2], one of the most significant demonstrations is to design
authentication and anti-countering protocol based on PUF made of a three-
dimensional random scattering medium. It is worth noting that the security of
majority of PUF implementations is guaranteed by the complex structure of
the corresponding physical objects, e.g., the random distribution of scatterers
in optical medium [1,2]. Therefore, these classical PUF-based authentication
protocols are theoretically breakable if infinite computing power is assumed.
To achieve a higher level of security, B. S˘koric´ proposed a new type of PUF,
the quantum-readout PUF, which combines the classical optical PUF with
the quantum challenges [9]. Recently the first proof-of-principle experiment of
PUF-based quantum-secure authentication has been demonstrated by S. A.
Goorden et al. [10], attracting a great deal of attention from researchers [11].
However, the security analysis of PUF-based quantum-secure authentica-
tion protocols is still not more than mature or integrate due to its relative
youth. To our best knowledge, only classical attacks, such as the challenge es-
timation attacks, have been considered [12,13]. As a further step towards com-
pleting the security analysis, in this work we proposed the quantum cloning
attacks, the first quantum attack scenario against quantum-secure authentica-
tion systems and investigate its effects upon the false-accept probability. The
outline of the reminder of this paper is as follows: In Sect. 2, we provide a brief
review of technical preliminaries of quantum-readout PUFs and notations used
throughout the paper. In the following Sect. 3, we investigate quantum cloning
attacks against PUF-based quantum authentication systems and prove that
quantum cloning attacks outperform the challenge-estimation attacks. In Sect.
4, we extend our consideration to other quantum cloning attacks in the frame-
work of quantum cryptography. Finally, Sect. 5 is devoted to the discussion
and conclusion.
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2 The model of PUF-based quantum authentication systems
2.1 The challenge and response behavior of optical PUFs
In this subsection, we mainly focus on the modeling of optical PUFs [1,2].
Note that the transport of light through a multiple-scattering medium can be
described by means of the scattering matrix or S-matrix [14]. Therefore, the
key point is to view the PUF as a black-box. If the collisions between photons
and scatterers are further assumed to be completely elastic, the behavior of
such a black-box can be fully characterized by a unitary transformation, which
is represented by a unitary S-matrix (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 The sketch of PUF-based quantum authentication system. The PUF device can be
characterized as the scattering matrix S, which relates to the transmission and reflection
matrices T and R respectively, according to Eq. (2). The spatial light modulator (SLM) is
used for creating the desired challenge states by modulating the phase of the initial laser
beam.
To describe the functionality of quantum-readout PUFs [9,10], three types
of quantum states are involved: the challenge state, reflected state and trans-
mitted state [9,10]. All these state we are dealing with have two intertwined
degree of freedoms: the internal degree of freedom characterizes the optical
properties (e.g., spin or polarization) but the external degree of freedom de-
picts the directivity of light (e.g., direction of motion), which is mathemati-
cally denoted as a tensor product of Hilbert spaces H = Hext ⊗ Hint. Thus,
any quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ H can be represented as
|ψ〉 = |outgoing〉 ⊗ |ψ1〉+ |incoming〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉 =
(
|ψ1〉
|ψ2〉
)
, (1)
where |incoming〉, |outgoing〉 ∈ Hext, |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 ∈ Hint and here incoming or
outgoing is with respect to the sender.
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Equipped with these notations, the interaction between the quantum state
and the optical PUF can be expressed as (see Fig. 1)
(
|ψ′1〉
|ψ′2〉
)
= S
(
|ψ1〉
|ψ2〉
)
=
(
T −R†
R T †
)(
|ψ1〉
|ψ2〉
)
, (2)
where the operators R and T denote the reflection and transmission subma-
trices respectively. Due to the unitarity of the S-matrix, we have the relation
RR† + TT † = 1.
2.2 The authentication protocol
We only consider the authentication protocol based on the reflected states by
assuming T = 0, following the experimental implementation in [10]. Note that
in this case there is no loss of generality since any transmitted state can always
be re-routed to become part of the reflected state [9]. The detailed protocol
consists of two steps:
•Enrollment phase: Alice assigns an identity code I to a specific quantum-
readout PUF and the challenge-response state pairs are measured with as much
light as needed. This procedure also yields the reflection matrix R [9]. The chal-
lenge along with the corresponding response is stored in a challenge-response
database. Then this PUF is delivered to Bob.
• Verification phase: At some time Bob claims to have access to the
quantum-readout PUF with the identifier I. Alice looks up the identity code
I in the database and finds the corresponding matrix R. Then she initializes
two counters n1 and n2 to zero and repeats the following procedure m times:
1. Alice randomly prepares a state |ψ〉 with uniform distribution and sends
it to Bob as a challenge state.
2. Within a permitted amount of time, Alice will obtain two distinctive re-
sponses: nothing or a reflected state |χ〉. If she receives a state, then
(1) The first counter n1 is increased by one;
(2) Since the reflection matrix R is known, the valid reflected state should
be |χψ〉 = R|ψ〉. Alice performs the measurement defined by the projec-
tion operators {E1 = |χψ〉〈χψ |, E0 = 1−E1} onto the received state |χ〉,
where the outcome ‘1’ and ‘0’ corresponds to E1 and E0 respectively.
If the outcome is ‘1’, the second counter n2 is increased by one.
Finally, if the fraction n1/m of the responses is not consistent with the ex-
pected noise level, the authentication is aborted; if n2 ≥ (1 − ε)n1 then Alice
is convinced that she has probed the PUF with the identifier I. Here ε is a
robustness parameter denoting the tolerable fraction of wrong responses.
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3 Quantum cloning attacks
3.1 Universal quantum cloning machine and false-accept probability
In Ref. [9,12,13], the challenge-estimation attacks or so-called intercept-resend
attacks have been considered for security analysis of PUF-based quantum au-
thentication systems, which are regarded as the strongest classical attacks (the
reason for this claim will be clear below). Here we propose the first quantum
attack scenario resorting to the optimal quantum cloning machines. Before
presenting main results, two observations attract our attention: (i) from the
experimental perspective, a weak coherent laser source is usually employed
instead of the fragile single-photon states, which implies that multi-photon
cases should be taken into account since every photon in these pulses will be
modulated by the spatial light modulator (SLM) with the same configuration
(see Fig. 1); (ii) the challenge state is chosen at random, which indicates that
no specific state is superior to others and thus the universal quantum cloning
machine is a more appropriate choice for our topic.
A N → M quantum cloning machine (QCM) is a completely positive
map L : B(H⊗N) → B(H⊗M ), which maps input density operators of N
identical pure originals into output density operators of M clones. In general,
the average fidelity of the cloning process is
FQCM(N,M) =
M∑
k=1
∫
ψ
1
M
〈
ψ
∣∣trk¯L (ψ⊗N)∣∣ψ〉 dψ, (3)
where L(ψ⊗N ) = ρ1,2,...,M and trk¯ denotes the trace with respect to all the
subsystems but k. Note that for a d-dimensional Hilbert space H, the set
of pure states is isomorphic with the complex projective space CP d−1. On
this space there exists a unique natural measure dψ, induced by the uniform
Haar measure dµ(U) on the unitary group U(d) [15,16]. If we restrict our
consideration to the universal quantum cloning machine (UQCM), then the
M clones are all in the same states since the output of the cloning machine
is supported on the symmetric subspace [17]. Therefore, the reduced state of
one copy can be defined using the notation Ls = tr1¯L = · · · = trM¯L. Now the
average fidelity can be expressed as
FUQCM(N,M) =
∫
ψ
〈
ψ
∣∣Ls (ψ⊗N)∣∣ψ〉 dψ. (4)
Equipped with these notations, we investigate the following attack model:
the adversary first intercepts the incoming N -photon pulse |ψ〉⊗N and then
applies the universal N →M qudit cloner. Then in the language of the exper-
iment [10], the collective unitary transformations R⊗ · · · ⊗R = R⊗M is auto-
matically performed by the optical PUF and the final stateR⊗ML
(
ψ⊗N
)
R†⊗M
is sent back to Alice. Note that here it is assumed that R is a public informa-
tion or the adversary has had access to the PUF temporarily in the past [9].
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section (see Appendix
A for more details).
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Theorem 1 Under the quantum cloning attack by N →M UQCM, the adver-
sary’s success probability or the authentication system’s false-accept probability
for a single copy is upper bounded by
Paccept ≤
M −N +N(M + d)
M(N + d)
, (5)
where d = dimH, which is determined by the SLM configuration.
Proof. Following the protocol described in Sect. 2.2, the projections of
each quanta (e.g., photon in [10]) are independent events in the detection
process. Therefore, we can trace out all other subsystems when considering
the single-copy case. Mathematically, the adversary’s success probability or
the authentication system’s false-accept probability for a single copy is
Paccept|ψ =
〈
χψ
∣∣RLs(ψ⊗N )R†∣∣χψ〉 = 〈ψ ∣∣R†RLs(ψ⊗N )R†R∣∣ψ〉
=
〈
ψ
∣∣Ls(ψ⊗N )∣∣ψ〉 , (6)
where the relation RR† = 1 is applied here. Note that Paccept|ψ is conditioned
on a specific challenge state. To eliminate this dependence, we can average
over the challenge state space (e.g., the pure state space)
Paccept = EψPaccept|ψ =
∫
ψ
〈
ψ
∣∣Ls (ψ⊗N)∣∣ψ〉 dψ = FUQCM(N,M). (7)
Unitizing the results in [17,18], the false-accept probability is upper bounded
by the optimal single-copy fidelity of UQCM
Paccept ≤ F
opt
UQCM(N,M) =
M −N +N(M + d)
M(N + d)
. (8)
This completes the proof. 
From Theorem 1, we can investigate the performances of the optimal
cloning attacks under various circumstances. In Fig. 2, we depict two extreme
but practically relevant cases: (i) when the single-photon light source is applied
(that is, N = 1), the false-accept probability Paccept is gradually reduced with
respect to the increase of the dimension d for fixed M . In this case, Paccept
becomes rather small when M and d are not quite large. For instance, for
M = 100 and d = 50, Paccept is already below 0.05; (ii) when the number
of copies M is considerably large (e.g., M = 2000), the quantum information
about |ψ〉 contained in copies is greatly diluted during the copying process
[19]. On this condition, when N > 200 and d < 100, Paccept is always above
0.7, which implies that the cloning attack is rather successful. However, if d
is greatly increased (e.g., d > 1000), the false-accept probability will be sig-
nificantly suppressed. This indicates that the dimension of quantum states
is a critical resource for the security of authentication protocol, especially
when the d is not particularly large. However, when d is sufficiently large,
PoptUQCM = F
opt
UQCM approaches N/M . In this case, it is more appropriate to
consider the number of copies as the resource.
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Fig. 2 (a) The false-accept probability Paccept as a function of the number of copies M
for different values of the dimension d, when the single-photon light source is applied (that
is, N = 1); (b) Paccept as a function of the photon number N of the incoming pulse for
different values of d, when the number of copies is rather large (M = 2000).
3.2 The relation between quantum cloning and challenge-estimation attacks
In previous literature, the challenge-estimation attacks have been evaluated
by B. S˘koric´ [12,13]. In fact, the strategy of this type of attacks is as follows:
the adversary (Eve) first performs a coherent measurement M = {Mj} of all
N qudits. Depending on the outcome r, a guess |ψj〉 for the input state |ψ〉 is
made. The average fidelity of the estimation process is defined as
Fest(N) =
∑
j
∫
ψ
tr(Mj|ψ〉〈ψ|
⊗N )|〈ψj |ψ〉|
2dψ. (9)
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It is worth emphasizing that the core of the problem is to find the optimal
measurement and the corresponding strategy to reconstruct the guess state.
Indeed, this universal algorithm for optimal estimation of quantum states has
already been established [20] and optimal fidelity has been derived [21]. From
these results and the equivalence between the false-accept probability and
the corresponding fidelity, B. S˘koric´ found the false-accept probability (per
quanta) for challenge-estimation attacks is upper bounded by
Pest ≤ P
opt
est =
N + 1
N + d
, (10)
where the subscript ‘accept’ is omitted henceforth for simplicity.
In comparison with quantum cloning attacks discussed above, two mathe-
matical observations catch our attention: (i) The upper bound of false-accept
probability of quantum cloning attacks is strictly larger than that of challenge-
estimation attacks
PoptUQCM =
M −N +N(M + d)
M(N + d)
> Poptest =
N + 1
N + d
, (11)
(ii) When M →∞, PoptUQCM is reduced to P
opt
est
lim
M→∞
PoptUQCM = P
opt
est =
N + 1
N + d
. (12)
In fact, there exists a strong relation between cloning the state of a quantum
system and acquiring knowledge about this state by performing measurements
[22,23]. As for our topic, these arguments in [22,23] can be summarized by the
following two theorems:
Theorem 2 The optimal quantum cloning attack is superior to the optimal
challenge-estimation attack.
Theorem 3 Asymptotic quantum cloning attack is equivalent to the challenge-
estimation attack.
The proof of Theorem 2 is relatively simple since an M → ∞ cloner can be
viewed as a combination of the optimal state estimation process and a recon-
struction procedure of preparing infinite copies of the guessed state. However,
this cloner is not necessary an optimal one. Mathematically, this argument can
be expressed as
FoptQCM(N,M) ≥ F
opt
est (N). (13)
On the other hand, Theorem 3 is rather nontrivial. This argument was first
proved to be true for the UQCM case [22]. Bae and Ac´ın extended this result to
general cases by using the monogamy of quantum correlations and the proper-
ties of entanglement breaking channels [23]. Mathematically, this equivalence
can be stated as
FoptQCM(N,M →∞) = F
opt
est (N). (14)
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Hence the QCM can be regarded as a universal device transforming quantum
information into classical information [19]. The relevant information flow is
illustrated in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 Diagram of the information flow from quantum to classical.
3.3 Experimental considerations
Obviously, the above theoretical findings are the guidance of experiment. How-
ever, experimental considerations are actually more complicated. In this sub-
section, we make several remarks on experimental setup.
• Remark 1: To avoid being detected by the verifier via monitoring the
photon number before the verification phase, the adversary (Eve) can trace
out M −N copies of the output state L
(
ψ⊗N
)
and resend the remaining N
copies back to Alice.
• Remark 2: In fact, the upper bound of the false-accept probability for
a single copy PoptUQCM is a function of the triple {N,M, d}. A closer look at
this function reveals that PoptUQCM is a monotone increasing function of N ,
but monotone decreasing with respect to M and d. Therefore, Alice and Eve
should take different operations according to their targets (see Table 1).
Identity Target N M d
Alice P ց N ց No control dր
Eve P ր No control M ց No control
Table 1 Targets of Alice and Eve and their corresponding manipulations.
In the protocol described in Sect. 2.2, a specific challenge state |ψ〉 is usually
applied m times. Thus, the expected total number of photons is NmPUQCM.
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Due to the photon loss and detection imperfections, actually if PUQCM ≥ 1−ε
the attacker will be accepted by the authentication protocol. Since the total
detection precess can be viewed as a sequence of Nm independent yes/no
experiments, the total false-accept probability obeys the binomial distribution
Ptotal =
Nm∑
k=⌈Nm(1−ε)⌉
(
Nm
k
)
PkUQCM(1 − PUQCM)
Nm−k
= IP (n+ 1, Nm− n) (15)
where n = ⌊Nm(1 − ε)⌋ and Ix(a, b) is the so-called regularized incomplete
beta function. We can prove that Ptotal is a monotone increasing function of
PUQCM, and thus the results in Table 1 can also be adopted to improve the
security of the authentication protocol (see Appendix B for more details).
• Remark 3: It is important to note that some imperfect single photon
sources are unitized in realistic experiments [10]. On this occasion, the number
of photons in a single pulse is not fixed and follows a certain probability
distribution (e.g., Poisson distribution for weak coherent states). Accordingly,
the verification threshold should be modified to Navm(1 − ε), where Nav =
EN [N ] denotes the average photon number. Meanwhile, we should average the
false-accept probability over such a distribution. In this case, we have
Pav ≤ EN
M −N +N(M + d)
M(N + d)
= EN
[
1 +
d− 1
M
−
(d− 1)(M + d)
M(N + d)
]
= 1 +
d− 1
M
− EN
[
(d− 1)(M + d)
M(N + d)
]
≤ 1 +
d− 1
M
−
(d− 1)(M + d)
EN [M(N + d)]
=
M −Nav +Nav(M + d)
M(Nav + d)
, (16)
where Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of 1/x are used. Note that the
only difference is the substitution N ⇒ Nav.
Actually, when the detection efficiency η is close to 1, the ideal single-
photon source is indeed a better choice for the verifier since the false-accept
probability Paccept is a monotone increasing function of Nav. However, in the
language of the experiment [10], the decision of acceptance or rejection is
totally determined by the difference of probability distribution of the number of
photodetections. Therefore, if the detection efficiency is rather low, the choice
of Nav = 1 will have a consequence that we can hardly distinguish between
the true and random PUF since in this case the number of photodetections is
too low and thus it is difficult to discriminate the corresponding probability
distribution. This situation will result in a lower probability of detecting an
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adversary who tries to pretend to have access to the PUF. Hence the verifier
can appropriately adjust the average photon number to a moderate value
(e.g., Nav = 230 ± 40 [10]), but note that on this condition the false-accept
probability Paccept is greatly increased. Therefore, a trade-off relation between
the average photon number and the detection efficiency should be taken into
considerations in a realistic experiment.
4 Comparison with QKD protocols and other cloning attacks
For QKD protocols, the relationship between the no-cloning theorem and the
security of quantum cryptography was already clarified in the first protocol,
that is, the BB84 protocol [24]. In fact, various types of quantum cloning
machines have been designed to analyze the security of QKD protocols. Par-
ticularly, quantum cloning attacks are proved to be the optimal incoherent
attacks for BB84 protocol, six-state protocol and continuous-variable proto-
cols [25,26]. Although there is no equivalence relation between the optimal
cloning and optimal eavesdropping, their relationship have been shown to be
strong and fruitful in the framework of quantum cryptography.
It is worth noting that the coding of BB84 and six-state protocols has been
generalized to larger dimensional quantum systems [27,28,29]. Specifically, the
spatial degrees of freedom is exploited in high-dimensional QKD experiments
[30,31]. Similarly, the high-spatial-dimension states of light are also employed
in the PUF-based quantum authentication experiment [10], where the number
of controlled modes d = 1100±200. Remarkably, the SLM has played a critical
role in creating the desirable challenge states. Intriguingly, in the context of
quantum cryptography, the SLM is also used to produce the d-dimensional
states, which are of the form [31]
|Ψ〉 =
1
d
ld∑
−ld
eiφl |l〉, (17)
where ld = (d − 1)/2, |l〉 form the logical basis in the d-dimensional Hilbert
space of the transmitted photons, and φl are the phases introduced by the
SLM [32].
Obviously, one possible scenario is that the adversary may acquire partial
information of the challenge states through the configuration of the SLM.
For instance, the adversary may know that a specific challenge state is of
the form (17). In this case, the phase-covariant quantum cloning machine
(PQCM) for qudits can be employed to launch an attack against the quantum
authentication systems, which is more powerful than the UQCM attacks [33].
For example, the optimal fidelity of 1→ 2 PQCM is larger than that of UQCM
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[33]
FoptPQCM(1, 2) =
1
d
+
1
4d
(
d− 2 +
√
d2 + 4d− 4
)
> FoptUQCM(1, 2) =
d+ 3
2(d+ 1)
. (18)
Therefore, the leakage of the configuration information of the SLM will greatly
compromise the security of the PUF-based quantum authentication systems.
At the same time, other quantum cloning machines such as PQCM can be
exploited to attack the the authentication systems.
5 Conclusions
In this work, we systematically studied the quantum cloning attacks on the
PUF-based quantum authentication systems. First, we obtained the analytical
formula of the false-accept probability by use of the universal quantum cloning
machines and proved that optimal quantum cloning attack outperforms the
so-called challenge-estimation attacks. Remarkably, we have established the
relationship between these two types of attacks and the information flow in
the whole process is clarified. Moreover, from the experimental perspective,
a trade-off between the average photon number and the detection efficiency
is discussed in detail. Finally, an explicit comparison is made between QKD
protocols and quantum authentication protocols and other possible cloning
attacks are illustrated.
In view of these findings, a set of topics can be pursued as the future
research directions: (i) A detailed and integrated security analysis of the PUF-
based quantum authentication protocols is still missing. Other sorts of attacks
may prove to be more efficient and the corresponding defending methods will
be proposed. Such a positive interaction between attacking and defending will
enable us to gain deeper insight into this subject. Interesting inspirations may
come from the field of quantum cryptography; (ii) Since QKD protocols can
be viewed as some form of “quantum PUFs” [34], the investigation of the
security of quantum cryptography may be unified into the framework of PUFs.
This new direction seems promising and the development of secure “quantum
PUFs” capable of tolerating realistic imperfections is of both practical and
fundamental importance.
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A Attack models
First, we would like to emphasize that not only in our attack model but also [9,12,13]
the target of the attacks is only the challenge state. In particular, in the context of the
experiment [10], the false PUF key is actually imitated by sending random challenges to the
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true key (see caption of Fig. 3 in [10]). In fact, in the language of [10], the verification phase
goes as follows: (i) the challenge state is determined by the configuration of SLM1; (ii) the
PUF automatically performs the unitary transformation R; (iii) the SLM2 functions as
the projection measurement (R|ψ〉)† = 〈ψ|R†. As shown in Fig. 4, it is evident that the
difference of the two attack models is that:
Challenge-estimation attacks: Quantum measurement strategy + State preparation
Quantum cloning attacks: Implantations of quantum cloning machines
Challenge
State
Quantum
measurement
PUF
State
preparation
Controlled
by SLM1
SLM2
Reflected
state
(a):Challege-estimation
attacks
Challenge
State
Quantum
Cloner
PUF
Controlled
by SLM1
SLM2
Reflected
state
(b):Quantum cloning
attacks
Fig. 4 The comparison of the attack models of challenge-estimation and quantum-cloning.
Since the attack model described in [9,12,13] adopts the so-called “measurement and
prepare” strategy, this attack model is classified to the (strongest) type of classical attacks.
However, in our attack model, no measurement is involved except for the projection of SLM2.
More precisely, we preform the quantum attack against the challenge state by employing
quantum cloning machines. Actually, the justification of our statement and [10] relies on the
following equivalence relationship:
Correct challenge state + Random PUF key
m
Random challenge state + True PUF key
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since an unclonable physical key (PUF) can be viewed as a unitary transformation. Note
that the only key difference lies in that the “measure and prepare” strategy is replaced
by “quantum cloning” scenarios in our model.
B The cumulative binomial probability function
In general, if the random variable X follows the binomial distribution with N trials and
success probability p for each trial, the cumulative distribution function can be expressed as
F (n;N, p) = P (X ≤ n) =
n∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
pk(1 − p)N−k
= I1−p(N − n, n+ 1)
= (N − n)
(
N
n
)∫ 1−p
0
tN−n−1(1− t)ndt (19)
where Ix(a, b) is the the regularized incomplete beta function
Ix(a, b) =
B(x; a, b)
B(a, b)
, (20)
B(a, b) is the beta function, and B(x; a, b) is the incomplete beta function. In our context,
the probability of obtaining more successes than n observed in a binomial distribution is
P (X > n) = 1− F (n;N, p) = Ip(n+ 1, N − n), (21)
where we have used the relation Ix(a, b) + I1−x(b, a) = 1. Note that the partial derivative
of B(x; a, b) with respect to x is
∂B(x; a, b)
∂x
= (1− x)b−1xa−1. (22)
Therefore, we have
∂Ip(n+ 1, N − n)
∂p
=
(1− p)N−n−1pn
B(N − n, n+ 1)
> 0, (23)
which implies that Ip(n+ 1, N − n) is a monotone increasing function of p.
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